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Abstract
By a classifying topos for a first-order theory T, we mean a topos
E such that, for any topos F , models of T in F correspond exactly to
open geometric morphisms F → E . We show that not every (infini-
tary) first-order theory has a classifying topos in this sense, but we
characterize those which do by an appropriate ‘smallness condition’,
and we show that every Grothendieck topos arises as the classifying
topos of such a theory. We also show that every first-order theory has
a conservative extension to one which possesses a classifying topos,
and we obtain a Heyting-valued completeness theorem for infinitary
first-order logic.
0 Introduction
It is by now well known that Grothendieck toposes are ‘the same thing as’
Morita-equivalence classes of geometric theories, in the following sense: for
every geometric theory T, there exists a topos B(T) (called the classifying
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topos of T) containing a model GT of T which is generic in the sense that,
for any Grothendieck topos F , the functor
Top (F ,B(T)) - T-Mod(F) ,
which sends a geometric morphism f : F → B(T) to the T-model f∗(GT),
is an equivalence of categories. Conversely, for every Grothendieck topos
E , there exists a geometric theory T such that E ' B(T). This theory is
not uniquely determined by E , in that one can have many different pre-
sentations of ‘the same’ theory; but if we regard two theories as (Morita-
)equivalent whenever they have equivalent categories of models in an ar-
bitrary topos, then the correspondence between (categorical) equivalence
classes of Grothendieck toposes and Morita-equivalence classes of geomet-
ric theories becomes one-to-one.
However, although a very large proportion of the first-order theories en-
countered in mathematical practice are (at least Morita-equivalent to) geo-
metric ones, we do occasionally need to consider models of theories which are
not geometric. (For example, as was first observed by Kock [14], it can often
be profitable to consider the non-geometric first-order sentences satisfied by
the generic model of a geometric theory.) For such theories, we cannot hope
to have a classifying topos in the above sense, since it is well-known that
geometric theories are exactly those whose models are preserved by inverse
image functors. Nevertheless, we do know several characterizations of those
geometric morphisms whose inverse image functors preserve arbitrary (in-
finitary) first-order logic: they are exactly the open geometric morphisms in
the sense of [9] or [12]. So we might hope that, for at least some first-order
theories T of interest, we could find a topos Bfo(T) and a natural equivalence
Open (F ,Bfo(T)) ' T-Mod(F) ,
where the left-hand side denotes the full subcategory of Top (F ,Bfo(T))
whose objects are open geometric morphisms. (Since every geometric theory
may also be considered as a first-order theory, we shall henceforth write Bg(T)
for the classifying topos of such a theory as defined in the first paragraph, in
order to distinguish it from the concept just introduced.)
Sadly, it is not possible to construct such a topos for an arbitrary first-
order theory T. The problem is, in a sense, that open geometric morphisms
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are ‘too well-behaved’: their inverse image functors preserve the interpreta-
tions, not only of finitary first-order formulae, but of arbitrary (L∞ω) infini-
tary ones as well. And there are simply too many of the latter, even if we
restrict ourselves to propositional logic. It is well known ([6], [7], [20]) that the
free complete Boolean algebra on a countable infinity of generators is a proper
class; perhaps less familiar is the fact [11] that the corresponding problem for
complete Heyting algebras occurs already with two generators—that is, there
is a proper class of L∞ω formulae in two propositional variables, no two of
which are (constructively) provably equivalent. The model-theoretic version
of this fact says that, for any cardinal κ, we can build a complete Heyting
algebra Hκ of cardinality at least κ which is generated by two elements. Now
let T be the empty theory in a language L with two primitive propositional
symbols: we can regard the generators of Hκ as a model of T in the topos
Sh(Hκ) of sheaves on Hκ. If the classifying topos Bfo(T) existed, this model
would be classified by an open geometric morphism f : Sh(Hκ)→ Bfo(T);
since f ∗ preserves the interpretations of arbitrary first-order formulae, we
see that it must be surjective on subobjects of 1, and hence (since this holds
for all κ) that the lattice of subobjects of 1 in Bfo(T) must be a proper
class—which is impossible.
However, we shall show in this paper that the above ‘cardinality problem’
is the only obstruction to the existence of Bfo(T). Specifically, we shall prove
that, for an arbitrary T, there exists a topos Bfo(T) with the universal prop-
erty described above if and only if, for every finite string ~x of variables in
the language of T, the complete Heyting algebra of T-provable-equivalence
classes of formulae with free variables in ~x is a set. Moreover, for any T
and any cardinal κ such that T may be axiomatized by formulae in Lκω,
there exists a canonical extension of T to a theory T with the above small-
ness property, which is Lκω-conservative (i.e. every Lκω sentence derivable
from T is derivable from T). In particular, the generic T-model in Bfo(T)
is an Lκω-conservative model of T. Also, every Grothendieck topos E oc-
curs, up to equivalence, as Bfo(T) for some T; thus we may, once again,
identify Grothendieck toposes with Morita-equivalence classes of ‘provably
small’ first-order theories.
The main ingredient in the proofs of the above statements is a char-
acterization of the open geometric morphisms into a Grothendieck topos
E = Sh(C, J) in terms of the flat and continuous functors on C which in-
duce them. We prove this result in section 1 of the paper. Sections 2 and
3
3 are devoted to reviewing material from categorical logic, culminating in
the ‘Heyting-valued completeness theorem’ for (intuitionistic) infinitary first-
order logic. In section 4, we show how to construct the first-order theory clas-
sified by a given topos E ; in particular, if E is given as the classifying topos
Bg(T) of a geometric theory T, we show that its first-order theory may be
taken to consist of all sentences satisfied in the generic model of T. In section
5 we prove our main theorem characterizing those first-order theories which
admit classifying toposes. Finally, section 6 is devoted to the discussion of
some examples and applications.
Throughout the paper, for simplicity, we shall work in the 2-category of
Grothendieck toposes (that is, toposes defined and bounded over the classi-
cal topos of sets Set); the word ‘topos’, unless otherwise stated, will mean
‘Grothendieck topos’. However, those readers who are accustomed to work-
ing over a base topos S will have little difficulty in extending our results
to the latter more general context (for any topos S with a natural number
object); of course, the cardinality bounds which we use have to be replaced
by bounds expressed in terms of subobjects of a suitable object of S.
Acknowledgements. The first author would like to thank Ieke Moerdijk
and Steve Awodey for many helpful discussions on this topic. The second
author would like to make a similar acknowledgement to Martin Hyland.
Part of the first author’s research was supported by a scholarship of the
University of Utrecht, and was part of a project funded by the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research NWO.
1 Open maps into sheaf toposes
Let E be the topos of sheaves on a (small) site (C, J). Diaconescu’s theorem
[3] asserts that, for any topos F , there is an equivalence between the category
Top (F , E) of geometric morphisms from F to E , and the category of flat and
continuous functors C → F (see also [15], section VII.7 or [8], proposition
7.13). Our aim in this section is to characterize those functors C → F which
correspond to open geometric morphisms, in the sense of [9] or [12].
Although, for most of this paper, our working definition of open maps
will be that they are precisely those geometric morphisms f : F → E whose
inverse image functors preserve full (infinitary) first-order logic, in the present
section it will be convenient to use the characterization of them in terms of
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the map τ : ΩE → f∗ΩF which is the transpose of the characteristic function
τ of the monomorphism f∗(>E). We recall that f is open iff τ has an internal
left adjoint λ : f∗ΩF → ΩE (see [9], theorem 3.2 or [12], p. 56).
Now suppose that E = Sh(C, J), and that the geometric morphism f
corresponds to a flat continuous functor F : C → F . Let ε : C → E denote the
composite of the Yoneda embedding C → [Cop,Set] with the associated sheaf
functor. Then we may identify ΩE with the sheaf which to an object A of C
assigns the set of subobjects of ε(A) in E , or equivalently the set of J-closed
sieves on A in C (recall that a sieve S is J-closed if, whenever we have a
morphism α : B → A and a J-covering sieve R on B such that αβ ∈ S for
all β ∈ R, then α ∈ S). Similarly, we may identify f∗(ΩF ) with the sheaf
whose value at A is the set of subobjects of f∗ε(A) = F (A). In terms of
these identifications, the map τ may be identified with the action of f∗ on
subobjects of ε(A); that is, τA(S  ε(A)) = (f ∗S  F (A)). Note also
that the action of a morphism α : A→ B of C on both ΩE and f∗ΩF is given












Lemma 1.1 The geometric morphism f is open if and only if
(i) for each object A in C and each family {Si | i ∈ I} of subobjects of ε(A)
we have
∧
i∈I τA(Si) = τA(
∧
i∈I Si); and
(ii) for each morphism α : A→ B in C and each subobject S of ε(A) we
have ∀F (α)τA(S) = τB∀ε(α)(S).
Here, as usual, ∀F (α) and ∀ε(α) denote the right adjoints of F (α)∗ and
ε(α)∗ acting on subobjects. We note that, in both conditions, the equality
sign could be replaced by an inclusion (≤) of subobjects, since the reverse
inclusion ≥ is automatic for any f .
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Proof Since Sub(ε(A)) and Sub(F (A)) are complete lattices, the first con-
dition of the lemma is equivalent to saying that each τA has a left adjoint
λA : ΩE(A)→ f∗ΩF(A). Given the existence of these left adjoints, the second










for every α : A→ B in C, i.e. to saying that the λA form a morphism of
sheaves λ : ΩE → f∗ΩF . So the two conditions together are equivalent to
saying that τ has an internal left adjoint in E , i.e. that f is open. 
We remark that Lemma 1.1 could also be deduced by combining [16],
lemma 6.1.8, with [9], theorem 3.2(v).
Using the description of ΩE(A) as the set of closed sieves on A, we get
the following translation of Lemma 1.1, which we state for future reference:
Corollary 1.2 The geometric morphism f is open if and only if




{∃F (β)F (B) | β : B → A ∈ Si} =
∨






(ii) for each α : A→ B in C and each closed sieve S on A,
∀F (α)
∨
{∃F (β)F (C) | β : C → A ∈ S} =
∨




Here ∀αS denotes the closed sieve
{γ : D → B | (∀β : D→ A)((αβ = γ)⇒ (β ∈ S))} .
The map ∀α : ΩE(A)→ ΩE(B) is the right adjoint of the action α∗ of α on
closed sieves.
We conclude this section with some more remarks about preservation of
logical connectives. If {ui : Ei → E | i ∈ I} is an epimorphic family of maps







Applying this to the epimorphic family {e : ε(A)→ E | e ∈ E(A), A ∈ ob C}
where E is any object of E = Sh(C, J), and to the image of this family under
f ∗ for some geometric morphism f : F → E , we obtain a commutative square











where F : C → F is the flat continuous functor corresponding to f , and the
vertical maps are induced by the action of f∗ on subobjects.
Lemma 1.3 Let f : F → E = Sh(C, J) be a geometric morphism. The func-
tor f ∗ preserves meets of families of subobjects of cardinality less than κ
(resp. all meets, implication, negation) if and only if it does so on subobjects
of representables.
Proof The nontrivial direction follows from the existence of the diagram (3)
for each object E in E . 
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This allows us to translate properties of f into properties of F and vice
versa, for example:
Corollary 1.4 The geometric morphism f is sub-open in the sense of [9]
(i.e. f ∗ preserves implication) if and only if, for each A ∈ ob C and every
two closed sieves S1, S2 on A, the image of the map∐
{α:B→A |α∗S1=α∗S2}
F (B) - F (A)
is the subobject f ∗S1⇔f ∗S2 of F (A)
Proof Since S1 ⇔ S2 = {α | α∗S1 = α∗S2}, the condition says that f∗
preserves ⇔ on the level of the site. But this is equivalent to saying that
f ∗ preserves implication, because in any Heyting algebra (h⇒ h′) ≡ (h⇔
(h ∧ h′)). 
2 First-order theories and syntactic categories
In this section we briefly recall the fundamentals of first-order categorical
model theory; for more details we refer the reader to [16], [15], chapter X or
[5], appendix B.
We shall work over a (possibly) many-sorted signature Σ specified by
giving a set of base sorts (denoted A,B,C, . . .), a set of primitive function-
symbols f, g, h, . . . and a set of primitive relation-symbols R, S, T, . . .; the
latter will always include an equality predicate =A for each sort A. Each
function- or relation-symbol has a specified type which is a finite string of
sorts; we write f : ~A→ B orR ⊆ ~A to indicate the type of a primitive symbol.
We identify constants of sort A with nullary function-symbols [ ]→ A (where
[ ] denotes the empty string of sorts), and primitive propositions with nullary
relation-symbols R ⊆ [ ]. A Σ-structure M in a category C with (at least)
finite products assigns to each sort A an object MA, to each function-symbol
f : ~A→ B a morphism Mf : M ~A→MB (where M ~A denotes the product
MA1×· · ·×MAn, if ~A = (A1, . . . , An)), and to each relation-symbol R ⊆ ~A
a subobject MR  M ~A (with the proviso that M(=A) is necessarily the
diagonal subobject of MA×MA).
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Our formal language is the infinitary language Lκω(Σ) (which we shall
abbreviate to Lκ when there is no danger of confusion): that is, we allow the
formation of infinite conjunctions
∧
i∈I φi and disjunctions
∨
j∈J ψj of formulae
provided (a) the cardinalities of the index sets I and J are less than κ, and
(b) the total number of free variables in any formula remains finite. (Note
that we always allow the empty conjunction > and the empty disjunction ⊥.)
Here κ denotes an infinite regular cardinal (as it will throughout this paper);
we allow the possibility that κ = ∞, the ‘cardinality of the universe’ (i.e.
that we place no restrictions on the size of conjunctions and disjunctions).
However, the restriction to finitely many free variables will remain in force
throughout. By a context, we mean a finite string ~x of distinct variables; we
shall write φ(~x) to indicate that ~x is a suitable context for the formula φ, i.e.
that all the free variables of φ appear in it (though it may contain variables
which do not appear in φ). The type of a context ~x is the string ~A of (not
necessarily distinct!) sorts of the variables in ~x.
By a first-order theory T over Σ, we mean (informally) a set of sentences
in L∞ω(Σ); however, we shall identify two theories T and T′ if each member
of the first set is deducible from the second, and vice versa. (Here it should
be emphasized that our notion of deducibility is relative to an intuitionistic
deduction-system such as that in [2]—suitably extended to handle the in-
finitary connectives, cf. [18] or [13]—since we wish to study models of our
theories in categories (such as non-Boolean toposes) where the rules of clas-
sical logic are not valid.) One might therefore be tempted to identify each
theory with its deductive closure (i.e. the class of all sentences deducible from
it); however, it is important for our purposes that the axioms of a theory form
a set rather than a proper class. (Note that this implies, in particular, that
for each theory T we can find a cardinal κ such that T is actually contained
in Lκω(Σ).)
We recall that a formula φ is said to be κ-geometric if it can be built
up from atomic formulae by means of finite conjunctions, disjunctions of
cardinality less than κ, and existential quantifications. (If κ =∞, we simply
say φ is geometric; if κ = ω, we say φ is coherent. A (κ-)geometric axiom is a
sentence of the form (∀~x)(φ⇒ψ) where φ and ψ are (κ-)geometric formulae
and ~x is a suitable context for them; a (κ-)geometric theory is one specified
by a set T of (κ-)geometric axioms.
In order to interpret compound formulae in a Σ-structure M , we need to
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impose further restrictions on the category C in which M lives. We recall
that a regular category is one with finite limits and (regular epi/mono) fac-
torizations, the latter being stable under pullback; by a κ-geometric category
we mean a regular category having unions for arbitrary families of subob-
jects of cardinality less than κ, the unions being additionally stable under
pullback. (Makkai and Reyes [16] call these κ-logical categories, and (in the
case κ = ω) Freyd and Scedrov [5] call them pre-logoi.) By a κ-Heyting
category, we mean a regular category C having unions and intersections for
families of subobjects of cardinality less than κ, and such that the operation
of pulling back subobjects of B along a fixed morphism f : A→ B of C has
a right adjoint ∀f (it follows that the unions, as well as the intersections, are
automatically stable under pullback; it is also easy to show that in such a
category we automatically have an implication operation making each subob-
ject lattice into a Heyting algebra, and that implication is also stable under
pullback). Again, this concept has been given different names elsewhere in
the literature; in particular, Freyd and Scedrov [5] call it a logos in the case
κ = ω. It is well known that any (Grothendieck) topos is an ∞-Heyting
category.
It is clear that, given a Σ-structure M in a κ-geometric (resp. κ-Heyting)
category C, we may proceed to interpret any κ-geometric (resp. arbitrary Lκ)
formula-in-context φ(~x) over Σ as a subobject [φ(~x)]M of MA1×· · ·×MAn,
where ~A = (A1, . . . , An) is the type of ~x. Moreover, this interpretation
is sound for the logical calculus mentioned above, in the sense that if a
sentence σ is deducible from a theory T, then it is satisfied in all T-models
in appropriate categories. (As usual, we say that σ is satisfied in a structure
M if [σ([ ])]M  M [ ] = 1 is an isomorphism, and that M is a T-model if it
satisfies all the sentences in T. For the geometric case, we need to modify
the definition of satisfaction: a geometric axiom σ = (∀~x)(φ⇒ψ) is satisfied
in M if [φ(~x)]M ≤ [ψ(~x)]M in Sub(M ~A).)
In order to form a category of T-models in C, where T is not necessarily
geometric, we need to exercise some care in our choice of morphisms. Clearly,
given Σ-structures M and N , we should expect a morphism f : M → N to
provide a C-morphism fA : MA→ NA for each sort A of Σ. Given this, for
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where f ~A is the product of the fAi . The usual definition of a (homo)morphism
of Σ-structures is equivalent to saying that we have [φ(~x)]M ≤ f ∗~A[φ(~x)]N (i.e.
that the above diagram can be completed to a commutative square) for all
atomic formulae φ; an easy induction then shows that the same condition
holds for all geometric formulae φ, but it is well known that the induction
breaks down for formulae involving implication or universal quantification.
A stronger condition, commonly known by the name embedding of Σ-
structures, is to demand an equality [φ(~x)]M = f
∗
~A
[φ(~x)]N for all atomic φ,
i.e. to demand that the diagram (4) should be completable to a pullback
square. Given that our language always includes the predicate =A whose
interpretation in anyM is the diagonal subobject ofMA×MA, this condition
clearly forces each fA to be monic. Once again, it is easy to show that this
condition is inherited by all quantifier-free formulae φ, but it may fail for
formulae involving quantifiers.
Classically, a morphism f is called an elementary embedding if the dia-
gram (4) is completable to a pullback square for all Lω formulae-in-context
φ(~x); it seems reasonable to use the term κ-elementary embedding if (4) is a
pullback for all Lκ formulae-in-context. (We shall give an example below to
demonstrate the dependence of this concept on κ.) However, the fourth cor-
ner of the parallelogram, namely the condition that (4) should commute for
all (Lκ) formulae, is not commonly considered by classical model-theorists.
Of course, the reason is that, if we restrict our attention to structures in a
Boolean topos such as Set, then the commutativity of (4) for the complemen-
tary subobjects [φ(~x)] and [¬φ(~x)] forces both the squares to be pullbacks;
but this is far from being the case in a non-Boolean topos (again, we shall
give an example below), and it turns out that this fourth condition is the
one of greatest importance for us.
Morphisms satisfying this condition seem to have been first explicitly con-
sidered (in the case κ = ω) in [17], where they were called ‘weak elementary
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embeddings’; but this name seems unsatisfactory since such morphisms do
not have to be monic. Accordingly, we introduce the name κ-elementary
morphism of Σ-structures for a family of morphisms fA such that we have
[φ(~x)]M ≤ f ∗~A[φ(~x)]N for all Lκ formulae-in-context φ(~x) over Σ. We write
Σ-Str(C)κ for the category of all Σ-structures in C and κ-elementary mor-
phisms between them; and, if T is a theory in Lκ, we write T-Mod(C)κ
for the full subcategory of Σ-Str(C)κ whose objects are T-models. (Note
that the subscripts cannot be omitted even in the case κ = ω; we use the
unsubscripted notations for the categories whose morphisms are arbitrary
homomorphisms of Σ-structures.)
Example 2.1 Let E be the Sierpiński topos whose objects are diagrams
A = (A(0)→ A(1)) in Set and whose morphisms are commutative squares.
Let Σ be the one-sorted signature whose only primitive symbol is equality (so
that Σ-structures are simply objects). Let N be the terminal object of E , and
let M be any object such that M(1) is a singleton. An easy induction shows
that the interpretation in N of any L∞ formula-in-context over Σ is either the
whole of Nn ∼= 1 or its zero subobject (that is, the intermediate subobject
(0 → 1) cannot occur); so, in order to prove that the unique morphism
M → N is ∞-elementary, it suffices to show that whenever [φ(~x)]N = 0 we
also have [φ(~x)]M = 0. But if [φ(~x)]N = 0, then since the functor ‘evaluate
at 1’ is the inverse image of an open geometric morphism Set → E we see
that the interpretation of φ(~x) in the terminal object of Set is also 0, and
hence also [φ(~x)]M(1) = 0. And this forces [φ(~x)]M(0) = 0; thus we have
shown that M → N is an ∞-elementary morphism. But it is clearly not an
embedding if M(0) has more than one element.
Example 2.2 To show the dependence of κ-elementarity on the cardinal κ,
it suffices to consider models in Set. Let Σ be the single-sorted signature with
a countable infinity of constant symbols ci (i ∈ ω); let M be the set of natural
numbers with ci interpreted as i for each i, and let N be any uncountable set
with each ci interpreted as a different element of N . It is easy to see that the
obvious embedding of Σ-structures M → N is ω-elementary, since M and N
have isomorphic ultrapowers (indeed, for a suitable choice of its cardinality,
N is isomorphic to an ultrapower of M); but it is not ω1-elementary since
the Lω1 sentence (∀x)
∨
i∈ω(x = ci) is satisfied in M but not in N .
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We next recall briefly the construction of the syntactic category Syng(T)
of a geometric theory T: for a detailed exposition, see [16], chapter 8 or
[15], chapter X. The objects of Syng(T) are equivalence classes [φ(~x)] of
geometric formulae-in-context in the language of T, where the equivalence
relation identifies φ(~x) with ψ(~y) if the contexts ~x and ~y have the same
type, and ψ is obtained from φ by substituting yi for xi, for each i. In
defining morphisms [φ(~x)] → [ψ(~y)] in Syng(T), we may therefore assume
(and it is convenient to do so) that the contexts ~x and ~y have no variables
in common; such a morphism is then defined to be a T-provable-equivalence
class of geometric formulae in the concatenated context ~x, ~y which are ‘T-
provably functional from φ to ψ’, in the sense that the appropriate geometric






is defined to be the provable-equivalence class of the formula (∃~y)(θ∧γ). The
verification that Syng(T) is a (geometric) category is tedious but straight-
forward. Moreover, it contains a structure UT for the signature of T obtained
by setting UTA = [>(x)] (where x is a variable of sort A), UT(R ⊆ ~A) =
[R(~x)]  [>(~x)], and UT(f : ~A→ B) = [(f(~x) = y)]. A straightforward
induction shows that, for every geometric formula-in-context φ(~x), the inter-
pretation [φ(~x)]UT is simply [φ(~x)], and hence we have:
Proposition 2.3 The Σ-structure UT in Syn
g(T) is a conservative model
of T; that is, it satisfies exactly those geometric axioms which are derivable
from T. Moreover, it is universal amongst T-models in geometric categories,
in the sense that for any geometric category C the functor
Geom (Syng(T), C) - T-Mod(C)
which sends a geometric functor F : Syng(T)→ C to the T-model F (UT), is
an equivalence of categories. (Here Geom (Syng(T), C) denotes the category
of geometric functors Syng(T) → C and arbitrary natural transformations
between them.) 
If the theory T is κ-geometric (for some κ <∞), then we may restrict our-
selves to κ-geometric formulae in defining the objects and morphisms of the
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syntactic category, and thus obtain a (small) κ-geometric category Syngκ(T)
with the corresponding universal property. However, there is no real need to
do so. Although Syng(T) is a large category, there is a canonical form the-
orem for geometric formulae which says that every such formula is provably
equivalent to one of the form
∨
i∈I φi where the φi are regular formulae (that
is, constructed using only finite conjunction and existential quantification):
since we may clearly omit duplicate copies of the same formula from any such
disjunction, it follows that we have, up to provable equivalence, only a set
of distinct geometric formulae in any context. Since T-provably equivalent
formulae-in-context define isomorphic objects of Syng(T), it follows that the
latter is (not only locally small but) essentially small, i.e. equivalent to a
small category—indeed, it is equivalent to Syngκ(T) for sufficiently large κ.
When working with full first-order logic, we do not have any such canon-
ical form theorem (indeed, as we noted in the Introduction, it is possible
to generate a proper class of inequivalent propositional formulae from just
two primitive proposition symbols), and so we shall have to be more careful
about the size of the formulae which we admit in the construction of our
syntactic category. Nevertheless, the purely formal parts of the construction
go through without any essential change. If T is a theory in Lκ (for some
κ ≤ ∞), we define the syntactic category Synfoκ (T), exactly as in the geo-
metric case, but admitting arbitrary formulae of Lκ in the definition of both
the objects and the morphisms of the category. Just as before, we may verify
Proposition 2.4 The category Synfoκ (T) is a κ-Heyting category (small if
κ <∞), and contains a conservative T-model UT which is universal amongst
T-models in κ-Heyting categories, in the sense that for any such category C
the functor
κ-Heyt (Synfoκ (T), C) - T-Mod(C)κ
which sends a κ-Heyting functor F : Synfoκ (T)→ C to the T-model F (UT), is
an equivalence of categories. 
For a detailed proof of 2.4 in the case κ = ω, see [5], B.314. Note, inci-
dentally, the change in the codomain of the displayed functor of 2.4 as com-
pared with 2.3: we are required to cut down to the κ-elementary morphisms
between T-models, in order to ensure that such morphisms correspond to
natural transformations between functors defined on the syntactic category.
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3 Syntactic sites and the completeness theo-
rem
If C is a small κ-geometric category (for example, the syntactic category of
a κ-geometric theory), we may equip it with the κ-covering Grothendieck
topology Jκ: a sieve R on an object A of C belongs to Jκ iff it contains a
family of maps (αi : Bi → A | i ∈ I) of cardinality less than κ, such that
the union of the images of the αi is the whole of A. By ([16], proposition
3.3.3) or ([15], lemma X.5.4), we know that this topology is subcanonical
(that is, all the representable functors Cop → Set are sheaves): moreover, a
functor F : C → E (where E is a topos) is flat and Jκ-continuous iff it preserves
finite limits, images and unions of families of subobjects of cardinality less
than κ—that is, iff it is a κ-geometric functor. Thus, on combining 2.3
with Diaconescu’s theorem, we immediately obtain the standard proof of the
existence of classifying toposes for κ-geometric theories: given such a theory
T, we may take Bg(T) to be the topos Sh(Syngκ(T), Jκ). Note also that,
since the Yoneda embedding y : Syngκ(T)→ Bg(T) is full and faithful, the
generic T-model GT = y(UT) satisfies only those geometric sentences which
are satisfied in UT (equivalently, derivable from T).
In passing, we remark that the choice of the cardinal κ is not crucial,
provided it is large enough for all the axioms of T to be expressible in Lκ.
The canonical form theorem for geometric formulae, mentioned in the last
section, ensures that if κ < λ then every object of Syngλ(T) is the union of
a family of subobjects of cardinality less than λ, all of which lie in Syngκ(T).
Hence it is easy to verify that the inclusion
(Syngκ(T), Jκ) - (Syn
g
λ(T), Jλ)
satisfies the hypotheses of the Grothendieck Comparison Lemma (cf. [15],
p. 588) and so gives rise to an equivalence of sheaf toposes. Once again,
the corresponding result is very far from being true when we replace the
‘geometric’ versions of the syntactic categories by the ‘full first-order’ ones.
The key result of this section is the following lemma which, although it
has a claim to be considered ‘folklore’, appears never to have been noticed
in print before.
Lemma 3.1 Let C be a small Heyting category, and let J be a subcanonical
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Grothendieck topology on C. Then the Yoneda embedding y : C → Sh(C, J)
preserves universal quantification.
Proof Let f : A→ B be a morphism of C, A′  A a subobject of A, and
write B′  B for ∀f (A′  A). Let R  yB be any subobject of yB in
Sh(C, J) such that (yf)∗(R) ≤ yA′ in Sub(yA); we must show that R ≤ yB′,
i.e. that every morphism in R factors through B′  B. Let g : C → B be
such a morphism, and let h : D→ A be its pullback along f ; then h ∈ f∗(R),
and so h factors through A′  A; that is, the image A′′  A of h satisfies
A′′ ≤ A′. Since image factorizations in C are stable under pullback, it follows
that the image B′′  B of g satisfies B′′ ≤ B′; so we have our required
factorization. 
The above proof may be compared with that of the result (which is un-
doubtedly ‘folklore’) that the Yoneda embedding of a small cartesian closed
category preserves exponentials. Indeed, in the particular case when C is
locally cartesian closed as well as a Heyting category, it follows from the
latter, since the functors ∀f are simply the restrictions of the functors Πf
(the right adjoints to pullback between slice categories) to subobjects. How-
ever, the significance of 3.1 itself is contained in the following two immediate
corollaries.
Corollary 3.2 If C is a small κ-Heyting category and Jκ denotes the κ-
covering topology on C, then the Yoneda embedding C → Sh(C, Jκ) is a κ-
Heyting functor.
Proof We have already observed that y is a κ-geometric functor (i.e. that it
preserves finite intersections, unions of cardinality less than κ, and images).
By the Lemma, it preserves universal quantification (and hence also impli-
cation in the subobject lattices); and it clearly preserves all intersections of
subobjects which exist in C. 
Corollary 3.3 (Completeness theorem for Lκω) Let T be an arbitrary
theory in Lκω(Σ). Then there exists a Grothendieck topos containing a con-
servative model of T, i.e. one satisfying only those sentences of Lκω(Σ) which
are derivable from T; moreover, this topos may be taken to be localic over Set.
In particular, any sentence of Lκω(Σ) which is satisfied in all T-models in
localic toposes is derivable from T.
16
Proof Apply 3.2 to the syntactic category Synfoκ (T). We have seen that the
universal model of T in this category is conservative, and since the Yoneda
embedding is full and faithful it reflects isomorphisms; so y(UT) is also a
conservative model of T. To obtain such a model in a localic topos, we
combine this observation with the result ([12], p. 59; [9], Proposition 4.4)
that for any Grothendieck topos E there exists an open surjection F → E
with F localic. 
Since the completeness theorem holds for all κ <∞, it follows easily that
its weak form holds for κ =∞ as well: that is,
Corollary 3.4 If T is a first-order theory and σ is any L∞ sentence satisfied
in all models of T in localic toposes, then σ is derivable from T.
Proof Given T and σ, we can clearly choose κ such that T ∪ {σ} ⊆ Lκ. So
the result follows from 3.3. 
On the other hand, the strong form of the theorem (the existence of a
single T-model which is Lκ-conservative) clearly fails for κ = ∞; for if T is
the empty theory over a signature Σ with two primitive proposition symbols,
then the result of [11] mentioned in the Introduction implies that a topos
containing an L∞-conservative model of T would have to have a proper class
of subobjects of 1.
In the case κ = ω, 3.3 was proved by P. Freyd, around 1975; his proof may
be found in [5] under the name ‘Stone representation theorem for logoi’ (and
see also [4], theorem 5.22, where the theorem is stated in terms of models in
categories of Heyting-valued sets). However, Freyd’s proof (which admittedly
yields a more precise result) is much less direct than the above. The obser-
vation that y(UT) yields a conservative model of T was made independently
by E. Palmgren [19] and the first author.
We note also that y(UT) is a minimal model of T in the sense of Moerdijk
and Palmgren [17]. Since any κ-Heyting functor is a κ-geometric functor, the
equivalence of 2.4 yields a full and faithful functor
T-Mod(F)κ - Top (F ,Sh(Synfoκ (T), Jκ)) (5)
for any topos F , sending a T-model M in F to the geometric morphism
whose inverse image extends the κ-Heyting functor F : Synfoκ (T)→ F corre-
sponding to M . In particular, for any such T-model M , we have a geometric
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morphism f such that f ∗(y(UT)) ∼= M . It is easy to see that every open geo-
metric morphism F → Sh(Synfoκ (T)) is in the image of (5) (since if f is open
then the composite f ∗ ◦y is a κ-Heyting functor Synfoκ (T)→ F , and so must
be the functor which corresponds to the T-model f∗y(UT)). However, it is
not the case in general that every T-model in F can be ‘classified’ in this way
by an open geometric morphism. Nor is it the case that an arbitrary geomet-
ric morphism f into Sh(Synfoκ (T)) is determined up to isomorphism by the
Σ-structure f ∗y(UT) (recall that a Σ-structure, according to our definition,
consists of the objects and morphisms interpreting the primitive symbols of
our language), even when the latter is a model of T. We shall investigate
this problem further in 4.4–4.6 below.
4 The first-order theory of a topos
Let E = Sh(C, J) be a topos; for convenience, we shall assume in this section
that the category C (is small and) has finite limits, so that flat functors on C
are just finite-limit-preserving ones. The standard proof that E occurs as a
geometric classifying topos Bg(T) takes T to be the theory of flat continuous
functors on (C, J), which we may present as follows. The sorts of our signa-
ture Σ are the objects of C, and each morphism f : A→ B of C is regarded
as a unary function-symbol of Σ; there are no primitive predicate symbols
except equality. The axioms of T fall into three groups: the first group, con-
sisting of all sentences (∀x)(1A(x) = x) where 1A is an identity morphism of
C, and (∀x)(f(g(x)) = h(x)) whenever fg = h in C, ensures that T-models
in a category F are in particular functors C → F . Then we have a group of
axioms to ensure that the functors preserve finite limits: specifically, we take
the sentences (∃x)> and (∀x, y)(x = y) where x and y are variables of sort











in C we take the axioms (∀x, y)((f(x) = g(y))⇒(∃z)((p(z) = x)∧(q(z) = y)))
and (∀z, z′)(((p(z) = p(z′)) ∧ (q(z) = q(z′)))⇒ (z = z′)), where the sorts of
the variables x, y, z are A,B, P respectively. Finally, to ensure that models




(∃yi)(fi(yi) = x)) ,
for each family (fi : Bi → A | i ∈ I) generating a J-covering sieve. (If J can
be generated by covering families of cardinalities less than κ, we note that
the resulting theory T is κ-geometric.)
The conditions on a flat continuous F for the corresponding geometric
morphism to be open, which we established in 1.2, can readily be translated















where {βj : Bj → A | j ∈ Ji} is a family of morphisms generating the closed
sieve Si, and {βk : Bk → A | k ∈ K} similarly generates
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where {βi : Ci → A | i ∈ I} and {γj : Dj → B | j ∈ J} are generating
families for S and ∀αS respectively. (As we observed after the statement
of 1.1, the bi-implications which appear in these two sentences could be
replaced by unidirectional implications (⇒), since the reverse implications
are automatic.)
We have thus established:
Proposition 4.1 For any Grothendieck topos E , there is an infinitary first-
order theory T such that we have a natural equivalence
Open (F , E) ' T-Mod(F)
for all Grothendieck toposes F . 
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Note that, on the right-hand side of the above equivalence, we have
the category whose morphisms are arbitrary homomorphisms between T-
models, and not just the elementary morphisms: this is because by defini-
tion Open (F , E) is a full subcategory of Top (F , E), and we know that mor-
phisms in the latter correspond to arbitrary homomorphisms of Σ-structures.
However, we shall see in a moment that it is at least possible to choose T in
such a way that every homomorphism of T-models is ∞-elementary.
To do this, we consider the case when E is given as the (geometric) classify-
ing topos of a geometric theory T, i.e. when (C, J) has the form (Syngκ(T), Jκ).
In this case, it would clearly be advantageous to express the first-order the-
ory (T, say) corresponding to E over the same signature as T, instead of
passing to the larger signature required to describe functors on the syntactic
category. In particular, we should hope that by taking T to consist of all
first-order sentences which are satisfied in the generic model GT, we might
obtain a theory adequate to characterize the open geometric morphisms into
E . (Of course, this T is a proper class, and therefore not a theory as we
defined it in section 2. However, it is clearly sufficient to choose a cardinal
λ which strictly exceeds the sizes of all the subobject lattices Sub(GT( ~A)),
for ~A a finite string of sorts of Σ, and then to take T to consist of all the Lλ
sentences satisfied by GT. Note that λ may well be strictly larger than the
cardinal κ required to express T as a theory in Lκ.)
Lemma 4.2 For the first-order theory T just described, every first-order
formula-in-context is provably equivalent to a geometric formula-in-context;
that is, given any formula-in-context φ(~x), we can find a geometric formula
ψ in the same context such that (∀~x)(φ⇔ψ) is derivable in T.
Proof The interpretation of φ(~x) in the generic T-model GT will be some
subobject of GT( ~A), where ~A is the type of ~x; but every such subobject also
occurs as the interpretation of some geometric (indeed, λ-geometric, where
λ is as above) formula-in-context ψ(~x). So the sentence in the statement of
the lemma is satisfied in GT, and hence derivable in T. 
We shall call a theory geometrically saturated if it has the property de-
scribed in the statement of Lemma 4.2. We note that, if T is geometri-
cally saturated, then any homomorphism of T-models is automatically ∞-
elementary, since we already observed that (4) is always completable to a
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commutative square for geometric formulae. (However, it seems unlikely
that this property characterizes geometrically saturated theories, since it
also holds when every formula-in-context is provably equivalent to a positive-
existential formula—that is, one constructed using infinitary conjunction as
well as the ‘geometric’ connectives.)
Proposition 4.3 Let T be a geometric theory. Then, for any topos F , we
have
Open (F ,Bg(T)) ' T-Mod(F) = T-Mod(F)∞ ,
where T is the full first-order theory of the generic T-model in Bg(T).
Proof The equality T-Mod(F) = T-Mod(F)∞ follows from the fact that T
is geometrically saturated, as we observed after 4.2. The equivalence with
Open (F ,Bg(T)) follows from the fact that, since every object and morphism
of Syng(T) is (the interpretation in GT of) a formula-in-context of L, we can
rewrite the conditions (6) and (7) as first-order sentences in this language.
(The other first-order sentences above, which we used to axiomatize the the-
ory of flat continuous functors on a site, can be similarly rewritten; but there
is no need to do so, since they translate into sentences which are derivable




of Syng(T), then the clause (∃y)(β(y) = x) (where x and y are variables of
sorts A and B) becomes the formula-in-context (∃~y)θ(~x). Thus we see that
if a T-model in F satisfies all the first-order sentences satisfied by GT, its
classifying map must be open; the converse is immediate. 
We note that, in addition to being geometrically saturated, the theory T
of 4.3 is a geometrically conservative extension of T—that is, any geometric
axiom derivable from T is already derivable from T—since GT is a (geomet-
rically) conservative model of T. We shall see in 5.4 below that these two
properties suffice to characterize T amongst extensions of T; and in 6.4 we
shall give an example of how an explicit description of the classifying topos
Bg(T) may be used to give an explicit axiomatization of the theory T.
We also note that the two properties ‘geometrically saturated’ and ‘ge-
ometrically conservative’ imply that T is maximal amongst geometrically
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conservative extensions of T; that is, any proper extension of it will prove
geometric axioms not derivable from T. However, this property does not
suffice to characterize T; see 6.2 below.
Finally in this section, we consider what can be said about the first-order
theory of a topos which is given to be of the form Sh(Synfoκ (T), Jκ) for some
first-order theory T in Lκω(Σ). In this case, we may again translate conditions
(6) and (7) into first-order sentences in Lλω(Σ) for sufficiently large λ, and
thus we obtain:
Proposition 4.4 Let T be a theory in Lκω(Σ). Then there exists a cardinal
λ > κ, and a theory T in Lλω(Σ), such that we have a natural equivalence
Open (F ,Sh(Synfoκ (T), Jκ)) ' T-Mod(F)∞
for any topos F . Moreover, T is an Lκ-conservative extension of T, and has
the property that every L∞ω(Σ) formula-in-context is T-provably equivalent
to a disjunction of Lκω formulae-in-context.
Proof Let γ be the cardinality of the set of morphisms of Synfoκ (T). Then it
is clear that any closed sieve on an object of this category can be generated by
at most γ morphisms, and that there are at most 2γ closed sieves on any such
object. Thus the index set of the conjunction appearing in (6) has cardinality
at most 2γ, and the disjunctions in both this condition and (7) are indexed
by sets of cardinality at most γ. So, if we take λ to be (2γ)+, and take T
to consist of all Lλ sentences satisfied by y(UT), it will certainly include all
instances of these two conditions. Thus we see that, given a T-model M in
F , the geometric morphism f : F → Sh(Synfoκ (T)) which corresponds to it
under (5) will be open iff M is actually a model of T. It follows that any L∞
sentence satisfied by y(UT) is satisfied in all T-models in toposes, and hence
(by the L∞ version of the completeness theorem) derivable from T; so the
latter really is the full first-order theory of y(UT). The conservativity of T over
T follows from the fact, already noted in 3.3, that y(UT) is an Lκ-conservative
model of T. And the final assertion follows from the fact that every L∞
formula-in-context over Σ, when interpreted in y(UT), yields a subobject of
some object of the site, which can be expressed as a closed sieve on that
object and hence as the union of at most γ subobjects corresponding to Lκ
formulae. (The same argument shows that every κ-elementary morphism
between models of T is ∞-elementary, and hence justifies the subscript ∞
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on the right-hand side of the displayed equivalence in the statement of the
Proposition.) 
Corollary 4.5 Let T be a first-order theory. If, for some cardinal κ such
that T is expressible in Lκ, the theory T of Proposition 4.4 is equivalent to
T, then T has a classifying topos in the sense defined in the Introduction.
Proof If T is equivalent to T, then every T-model is classified by an open
geometric morphism into Sh(Synfoκ (T)) (that is, the image of (5) consists
precisely of the open geometric morphisms); also, the argument at the end
of the proof of 4.4 shows that every κ-elementary morphism of T-models is
∞-elementary. So we may take Sh(Synfoκ (T)) to be Bfo(T). 
The criterion provided by 4.5 for existence of Bfo(T) is not a very practical
one, since it is in general very hard even to determine the axioms of T, let
alone to determine whether they are derivable from those of T. In the next
section, we shall provide a criterion (local smallness) which at least has the
appearance of being more manageable, and which incidentally enables us to
show that the converse of 4.5 is also true.
If T fails to satisfy the hypothesis of 4.5, it is still of interest to consider
what can be said about the relationships between the toposes Sh(Synfoκ (T))
for different values of κ. For the moment, let us fix a pair of regular cardinals
κ < λ such that T is expressible in Lκ. The inclusion functor Synfoκ (T) →
Synfoλ (T) is clearly a κ-Heyting functor, and hence continuous (i.e. cover-
preserving) when these two categories are equipped with the topologies Jκ
and Jλ respectively; so it induces a geometric morphism
Sh(Synfoλ (T), Jλ)
rλκ
- Sh(Synfoκ (T), Jκ)
whose inverse image sends the minimal T-model in Sh(Synfoκ (T)) to that in
Sh(Synfoλ (T)).
Moreover, it is easy to see that the diagram
T-Mod(F)λ - Top (F ,Sh(Synfoλ (T)))
T-Mod(F)κ
?




(where the left vertical arrow is the inclusion, the right vertical arrow is in-
duced by composition with rλκ, and the horizontal arrows are instances of (5))
commutes up to natural isomorphism for any F , since both ways round send
a T-model in F to the geometric morphism induced by the κ-Heyting func-
tor Synfoκ (T) → F which corresponds to it. Taking F = Sh(Synfoκ (T)), we
see that the geometric morphism iλκ : Sh(Syn
fo
κ (T))→ Sh(Synfoλ (T)) which
corresponds to the minimal T-model in Sh(Synfoκ (T)) satisfies rλκ ◦ iλκ ∼= 1;
that is, Sh(Synfoκ (T)) is a retract of Sh(Synfoλ (T)). However, composition
with iλκ does not in general induce a commutative diagram similar to (8).
Corollary 4.6 For a first-order theory T in Lκ, the following are equivalent:
(i) Sh(Synfoκ (T)) has the universal property of a classifying topos Bfo(T);
that is, for any topos F , the image of the functor (5) is exactly the
category of open geometric morphisms F → Sh(Synfoκ (T)).
(ii) For all λ > κ, the geometric morphisms rλκ and i
λ
κ defined above are
equivalences.
(iii) For all λ > κ, the morphism rλκ is open.
Proof (i)⇒ (iii) by the definition of Bfo(T).
(iii)⇒ (ii): If rλκ is open, then the composite




is a λ-Heyting functor, where the first factor corresponds to the minimal
T-model in Sh(Synfoκ (T)); and the composite clearly corresponds to the
minimal T-model in Sh(Synfoλ (T)). It follows that the composite iλκ ◦ rλκ
is isomorphic to the identity; so rλκ and i
λ
κ are inverse equivalences in Top.
(ii)⇒ (i): If (ii) holds, then the minimal T-model in Sh(Synfoκ (T)) is an
Lλ-conservative model of T, for all λ > κ. In particular, taking λ to be the
cardinal defined in the proof of 4.4, we deduce that T is equivalent to T; so
the result follows from 4.5. 
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Given a theory T which has no classifying topos (cf. 6.6 below), we can
therefore expect the sequence of toposes Sh(Synfoλ (T)) to ‘grow unboundedly’
with the cardinal λ. It is tempting to speculate that it might be possible
to embed Top in some larger 2-category in which one could compute the
‘limit as λ → ∞’ of these toposes, and hence obtain an object which might
support a truly generic T-model, even in the cases when the sequence does not
‘stabilize’ for sufficiently large λ. But we shall not pursue these speculations
here.
5 Locally small theories
Definition 5.1 Let T be an infinitary first-order theory over a signature
Σ. We say T is locally small in a context ~x if there is a set S~x of formulae
in the context ~x, such that every L∞ formula in this context is T-provably
equivalent to a member of S~x. We say T is locally small if it is locally small
in every context over Σ.
Note that T is locally small iff there exists a cardinal κ such that every L∞
formula-in-context over Σ is T-provably equivalent to an Lκ formula. Note
also that any geometrically saturated theory, as defined after 4.2, is locally
small, by the canonical form theorem for geometric formulae. Conversely, we
have:
Lemma 5.2 Let T be a locally small theory over a signature Σ. Then there
exists a signature Σ′ extending Σ, and a geometrically saturated theory T′
over Σ′, such that T′ is ‘Morita-equivalent’ to T in the sense that for every
topos F we have an equivalence
T-Mod(F)∞ ' T′-Mod(F)∞ ,
and these equivalences are natural with respect to open geometric morphisms.
Proof We use (a version of) the technique known to model-theorists as
‘Morleyization’: we extend the signature Σ by adding, for each context ~x
and each member φ of S~x, a new relation symbol Rφ  ~A (where ~A is
the type of ~x). For the axioms of T′, we take those of T together with all
sentences of the form
(∀~x)(Rφ(~x)⇔φ) .
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A straightforward induction then shows that every formula-in-context over Σ′
is T′-provably equivalent to a formula over Σ, and hence to an atomic formula
over Σ′, so T′ is geometrically saturated (indeed ‘atomically saturated’). On
the other hand, given any T-model M in a topos F , there is a unique way of
interpreting the additional primitive symbols of Σ′ which makes M into a T′-
model, and similar remarks apply to∞-elementary morphisms between such
models; so we have the required equivalence T-Mod(F)∞ ' T′-Mod(F)∞.
We are now ready for our main theorem:
Theorem 5.3 For an infinitary first-order theory T, the following conditions
are equivalent:
(i) T is locally small.
(ii) T is Morita-equivalent to a geometrically saturated theory.
(iii) T has a first-order classifying topos; i.e. there exists a topos Bfo(T)
containing a T-model GT such that, for every topos F , the functor
Open (F ,Bfo(T)) - T-Mod(F)∞
sending an open geometric morphism f to f∗(GT) is an equivalence of
categories.
Proof (i)⇒ (ii) is Lemma 5.2.
(ii)⇒ (iii): It is clear that, if two theories are Morita-equivalent in the
sense of 5.2, then one has a first-order classifying topos iff the other does; so
we may as well assume that T itself is geometrically saturated. But, for a ge-
ometrically saturated theory T, the inclusion functor Syng∞(Tg)→ Synfo∞(T)
is an equivalence, where Tg denotes the geometric part of T, i.e. the set of
all geometric axioms (strictly, of κ-geometric axioms for a sufficiently large
κ) derivable from T. In particular, for such a κ, the inclusions Synfoκ (T) →
Synfoλ (T) are equivalences for all λ > κ (since both categories are equivalent
to Syngκ(Tg)); so condition (ii) of 4.6 is trivially satisfied.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Suppose Bfo(T) exists. It follows from the L∞ version of
the completeness theorem (3.4) that the generic T-model GT in Bfo(T) must
be L∞-conservative. Thus the lattice of T-provable-equivalence classes of
formulae in a context ~x maps injectively to the subobject lattice Sub(GT( ~A)),
where ~A is the type of ~x; hence it is a set. 
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Note that it would be possible to give a direct proof of (i)⇒ (iii) by ex-
ploiting the fact that, for a locally small theory T, the inclusion Synfoκ (T)→
Synfo∞(T) is an equivalence for sufficiently large κ. However, the detour via
geometrically saturated theories is of interest in its own right (cf. Example
6.3 below). Another benefit of the detour is the following corollary, promised
in the last section:
Corollary 5.4 For any geometric theory T, there is (up to equivalence) ex-
actly one geometrically conservative extension of T which is geometrically
saturated, namely the full first-order theory of the generic model in Bg(T).
Proof We saw after 4.3 that the full first-order theory T of the generic T-
model has these two properties. Conversely, suppose S is any extension of T
with these properties. Then S is locally small, and so has a classifying topos
Bfo(S); and by the proof of (ii)⇒ (iii) in 5.3 we see that in fact Bfo(S) '
Bg(Sg), and that this equivalence identifies the generic model of S with the
generic model of Sg. But Sg is equivalent to T by conservativity; so all the
sentences in T must be derivable from S, and conversely. 
6 Examples and applications
Example 6.1 If T is a propositional theory (that is, if the signature Σ has
no sorts—so that the only primitive symbols are propositions, and the only
context is the empty one), then the syntactic category Synfo∞(T) is simply
the complete Heyting algebra generated by the primitive propositions, mod-
ulo the filter generated by the propositions in T. Provided this algebra is
small, the classifying topos Bfo(T) is simply the topos of sheaves on it (for
its canonical topology). For example, it is well known that the free complete
Heyting algebra on one generator (unlike that on two generators, as previ-
ously mentioned) is a set: it has just one more element than the free Heyting
algebra H on one generator, which is pictured on page 35 of [10] (the extra
element comes immediately below the top element of H, and is the supre-
mum of all the other elements of H). Equivalently, we may describe the free
complete Heyting algebra as the algebra of ideals of H (since all but one of
these ideals are principal); so if T is the empty theory over the propositional
signature with a single primitive proposition, we may identify Bfo(T) with
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the topos of sheaves on H for the finite cover topology. (Note, incidentally,
that this particular T is not itself geometrically saturated.)
Example 6.2 If we consider the empty theory on one propositional genera-
tor p as a geometric theory, then its classifying topos Bg(T) is well known to
be the Sierpiński topos [2,Set] (cf. Example 2.1), or equivalently the topos
of sheaves on the Sierpiński space S = {0, 1} with just one open point. It
is easy to see that the full first-order theory of this topos is axiomatized by
the single proposition ¬¬p; geometrically, this corresponds to the fact that
a continuous map X → S is open iff the corresponding open subset of X
is dense. From the explicit description of the free complete Heyting algebra
on one generator mentioned in the previous example, it may be seen that T
has just two maximal geometrically conservative extensions; one is axioma-
tized by ¬¬p and the other by (p ∨ ¬p). But the latter is not geometrically
saturated, since ¬p is not provably equivalent to a geometric formula.
Example 6.3 Let T be a geometric theory whose geometric classifying topos
Bg(T) is Boolean. Since every geometric morphism into a Boolean topos
is open ([9], 3.5), it follows easily that Bfo(T) (exists and) coincides with
Bg(T). Conversely, if a geometric theory T is equivalent to its geometrically
saturated extension T, as defined in 4.3, then every geometric morphism into
Bg(T) is open, and so the latter must be Boolean. (Thus the phenomenon
first observed by Kock [14], that the generic model of a geometric theory may
satisfy first-order sentences not derivable from that theory, is typical of all
such theories having non-Boolean classifying toposes.)
We recall that in [1] Blass and Scedrov characterized those coherent (that
is, ω-geometric) theories whose classifying toposes are Boolean: their charac-
terization involved the conjunction of two conditions, of which the first was a
finiteness condition and the second was (the finitary version of) what we have
called ‘geometric saturatedness’. (Actually, in defining the latter, they used
a notion of ‘T-provable equivalence’ relative to a classical logical calculus,
rather than the (much more restrictive) constructive provable equivalence
which we require. However, if it is already known that Bg(T) is Boolean,
then the two notions of equivalence agree, since each is equivalent to saying
that the interpretations of two formulae-in-context coincide in the generic
model.) Examples of such theories include the theories of infinite decidable
sets, and of dense (trichotomous) linear orderings without endpoints.
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Example 6.4 As an example of the explicit computation of the full first-
order theory of the generic model of a geometric theory, we consider the
theory O of objects: that is, the empty theory over the single-sorted signature
with no primitive symbols except equality. It is well known ([8], 6.33; [15],
VIII 4.3) that the object classifier Bg(O) may be identified with the functor
category [Setf ,Set], where Setf is (a small skeleton of) the category of
finite sets, the generic object GO being the inclusion functor Setf → Set. If
one considers what first-order sentences are satisfied by GO, it is not hard
for anyone familiar with Kripke–Joyal semantics to verify that they include
(∀x, y)¬¬(x = y), ¬¬(∃x)> and
(∀x1, . . . , xn)¬(∀y)
n∨
i=1
(y = xi) (9)
for each n > 0. (We can think of the first two sentences as saying that GO
is ‘not not a singleton’, and of (9) as saying that it is ‘not not infinite’. Note
also that the second axiom may be considered as the case n = 0 of (9).)
Many years ago, the second author conjectured that the above sentences
might suffice to axiomatize the full first-order theory of GO; but at the time
he lacked any means of verifying or disproving this conjecture. With the
machinery provided by section 1 of this paper, we are now able to show that
the conjecture is false, but that it is in a sense ‘very close to the truth’. In
the first place, we note that since any monomorphism with nonempty domain
in Setf is split, a cosieve on a nonempty object of Setf is determined by
the epimorphisms which it contains; and since there are (up to isomorphism)
only finitely many epimorphisms with a given domain in Setf , it follows
that the subobject lattice of each representable functor Setf → Set is finite.
(In the notation introduced before 4.2, we can take the cardinal λ to be ω.)
In particular, in determining what it means for a flat functor Setopf → F
to induce an open geometric morphism, we do not have to worry about
condition (1) of 1.2, on infinite intersections of subobjects; all the work is
done by condition (2), on universal quantification. Further, since Setf is
generated as a category by the surjections (n + 1) → n which identify a
single pair of elements and the injections n → (n + 1) which add a single
new element, it suffices to consider condition (2) for morphisms of these two
forms.
Of course, given an object A of a topos F , the corresponding flat functor
F : Setopf → F is simply the functor n 7→ An; equivalently, it sends n to the
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interpretation [>(x1, . . . , xn)]A. A cosieve R on n in Setf , as we observed
above, is generated by a finite set of surjections with domain n: each of these
is in turn specified by a finite list of pairs of elements of n to be identified,
and so we can think of R as the interpretation in GO of a finite disjunction of
finite conjunctions of equations (xi = xj); that is, of a positive quantifier-free
formula φ in the context (x1, . . . , xn).
Now let α : n+ 1→ n be the surjection which identifies the last two el-
ements of n + 1, and suppose given a cosieve R on n, corresponding to a
positive quantifier-free formula φ. The cosieve ∀α(R) on n+ 1 consists of all
those morphisms n + 1 → p whose pushouts along α lie in R; but we may
restrict our attention to surjections, which correspond to finite conjunctions
of equations in (x1, . . . , xn, xn+1), and the condition for such a conjunction
ψ to determine a morphism in ∀α(R) is simply that
(∀x1, . . . , xn+1)((ψ ∧ (xn = xn+1))⇒φ) (10)
should be provable. On the other hand, if F : Setopf → F corresponds to
an object A of F , then ∀F (α)(F (R)) is the largest subobject of An+1 whose
intersection with F (α) : An An+1 is contained in F (R); that is, it is the
interpretation in A of the formula ((xn = xn+1)⇒φ). So in this case condition
(2) becomes the validity in A of the sentence







where the disjunction on the right is over all finite conjunctions of atomic
formulae ψ satisfying (10). However, since φ does not involve xn+1, from
((xn = xn+1)⇒ φ) we may deduce ((xn = xn)⇒ φ) by substitution, and
provided φ actually involves a variable this reduces to φ; so (11) is auto-
matically satisfied except possibly in the cases when φ is either > or ⊥.
For φ = > it is again automatic; and for φ = ⊥ it simply reduces to
(∀x1, . . . , xn+1)(((xn = xn+1) ⇒ ⊥) ⇒ ⊥), which is (essentially) the first
of the three sentences listed above.
For the injections n → n + 1, it is necessary to consider the case n = 0
separately, and we deal with this first. There are only two cosieves on 1 in
Setf , and the validity of (2) for the top one is again automatic, so we need
only consider the empty cosieve. The universal quantification of this cosieve
along 0 → 1 is again empty, whereas if we perform the quantification in F
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we obtain [(∀x)⊥]A = [¬(∃x)>]A, so the condition we obtain is simply the
sentence ¬¬(∃x)>.
Finally, consider the inclusion β : n→ n+ 1 (n > 0) and a cosieve R on
n+ 1, corresponding to a positive quantifier-free formula φ in (x1, . . . , xn+1).
We find that a surjection from n, corresponding to a conjunction of atomic
formulae ψ in (x1, . . . , xn), belongs to ∀β(R) iff (∀x1, . . . , xn+1)(ψ ⇒ φ) is
provable. So condition (2) in this case becomes the sentence
(∀x1, . . . , xn)((∀xn+1)φ⇒
∨
ψ),
where the disjunction is over all ψ as above. If φ itself does not mention xn+1,
this is trivially satisfied; if it does, then from φ we may deduce (
∨n
i=1(xn+1 =
xi)∨φ′), where φ′ is the disjunction of all those conjunctions of equations in
φ that do not mention xn+1. So the condition we require is










where φ is any positive quantifier-free formula in (x1, . . . , xn). Of course,
(9) is just the special case of this when φ = ⊥; conversely, we could deduce
(12) from (9) if we had the (constructively invalid) ‘dual Frobenius rule’
that (∀x)(χ ∨ φ) entails ((∀x)χ ∨ φ) provided x is not free in φ. Thus our
axiomatization of the full first-order theory of GO is exactly that conjectured
above, except for the replacement of the scheme (9) by the stronger (12).
We remark that (12) is a genuine strengthening of (9). Let F = [N,Set]






- A(2) - · · · .
Let A be the object defined by A(i) = {0, 1} for all i, and αi(0) = αi(1) = 0
for all i. Then A satisfies (9) (as well as the other two conditions in our
axiomatization), but fails to satisfy (12) for n = 2 with φ taken to be (x1 =
x2). Note also that the classifying map F → Bg(O) of A is induced by a
functor N → Setf (namely A itself!); it may be verified that this functor
satisfies (the dual of) condition (a) of ([9], 2.5) but not condition (b) or (c),
and so the classifying map of A is sub-open but not open. On the other
hand, if we modify A by taking each A(i) to be a three-element set, then its
classifying map is not even sub-open.
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Similar techniques may be used to axiomatize the full first-order theories
of other familiar toposes such as the topos of simplicial sets.
Example 6.5 In [17], Moerdijk and Palmgren construct a topos containing
a minimal model of Heyting arithmetic (HA). It is easy to see that their
construction is exactly that of the topos Sh(Synfoω (HA)), together with the
minimal model y(UHA). On the other hand, the minimal model which they
construct for the theory HAI (Heyting arithmetic extended by an external
induction scheme for standard natural numbers and an overspill principle),
is not simply y(UHAI), since it is not conservative (see [17], 4.10).
Example 6.6 The fact (already mentioned in the Introduction) that the free
complete Heyting algebra on two generators is a proper class [11] enables us
to show that ‘most’ familiar theories are not locally small. Given a theory T
and a context ~x, let us say that two formulae φ and ψ in the context ~x form
a free pair if, given any topos E and any two subobjects U, V of the terminal
object of E , we can find a T-model M in E , together with an assignment of
elements ci : 1→MAi to the variables xi in ~x, such that the interpretations
[φ(~c)]M and [ψ(~c)]M are U and V respectively. (For example, if T is the
theory of objects (as in 6.4), then the formulae (x = y) and (y = z) are a
free pair in the context (x, y, z), since we can take M to be the colimit of the
diagram
1  U- - 1  V- - 1 ,
with the obvious assignment of values to the three variables. The same pair
of formulae will be free for any (single-sorted) theory T with the property
that any object of a topos can occur as a subobject of the underlying object
of a T-model.) If T has a free pair of formulae in the context ~x, then it
cannot be locally small in that context, since by taking E = Sh(Hκ) (where
Hκ is a two-generator complete Heyting algebra of cardinality at least κ, as
in the Introduction) and taking U and V to be the generators of Hκ, we see
that the propositional combinations of the free pair of formulae will yield at
least κ inequivalent formulae in the context ~x.
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